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Abstract 
 
Tax is traditionally viewed as the main funding mechanism for government spending. 
Consequently, social policy is often seen as something determined and constrained by tax 
UHYHQXH0RGHUQ0RQHWDU\7KHRU\µ007¶SUHVHQWVDUHYHUVal of the tax-spend cycle, by 
identifying a spend-tax cycle.  Using the UK as an example, we highlight that one of 
007¶VPRVWLPSRUWDQWEXWXQGHUH[SORUHGFRQWULEXWLRQs is its potential to re-frame the 
role of tax from both a macroeconomic and social policy perspective. We use insights on 
the money removal, or cancellation function of taxes, derived from MMT, to demonstrate 
how this also creates possibilities for using tax to achieve social objectives such as 
mitigating income and wealth inequality, increasing access to housing, or funding a Green 
New Deal. For social policy researchers the challenge arising is to use these insights to re-
engineer tax systems and redesign social tax expenditures (STEs) for creative social policy 
purposes.   
 
Keywords: Tax, modern monetary theory, social policy, modern tax theory, money, debt, 
government  
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Introduction 
The role of tax in society is complex. As the Mirrlees Review (IFS 2011, 2) noted, 
reiterating an observation made by Schumpeter over a hundred years ago (Schumpeter, 
1991 [1918]), tax systems have to suit the societies that create them. Nevertheless, the 
Mirrlees Review viewed tax policy choices largely through a utilitarian revenue-raising 
lens. It presented taxes and government spending as separate issues, rather than as a single 
system for government intervention in an economy (Kay, 1986). Drawing on insights from 
Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) we outline a spend-tax cycle that reverses the 
relationship commonly assumed to exist in a tax-spend cycle, and explore the implications 
of this reversal for using tax as an instrument of social policy. This alternative framing has 
considerable appeal for understanding and designing taxes from a social policy perspective.  
Awareness of tax and tax expenditures as social instruments in their own right does have 
some history (Surrey, 1974,) but this is not how tax is commonly perceived. Tax as social 
SROLF\LVRIWHQ³KLGGHQ´ to disassociate it from welfare hand-outs (Howard, 1997,) or to 
conceal how it favours high-income groups. The distributional effects of tax policy choices 
and instruments have certainly been investigated by social policy scholars (Sinfield, 2000, 
Avram, 2018, Ferrarini and Nelson, 2003). Efforts to understand the social and political 
processes present in taxation and their social and political consequence have also been 
XQGHUWDNHQXQGHUWKHXPEUHOODRIWKHµQHZILVFDOVRFLRORJ\¶0DUWLQ0HKRUWDDQG3UDVDG
2009, Schumpeter, 1918, p.101, Barker, 1992). Other research has explored the strategies 
through which actors on the left and the right seek to build social movements to change 
taxation policy (Martin, 2015; Seabrooke and Wigan, 2015). Nevertheless, efforts to 
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conceptualise the role and function of tax in society, including the possibilities arising from 
this by drawing on macroeconomic rationales and framings remain rare. The normative 
choices, agency and possibilities involved in the setting of tax policies, have consequently 
RIWHQEHHQREVFXUHGDQGUHFHLYHGWRROLWWOHDWWHQWLRQ2¶1HLOODQG2UU:HSODFH
consideration of the role of tax in a macroeconomic context, so as to renew debates about 
tax as a potential instrument of social policy, while challenging social policy academics to 
consider what implications a spend-tax cycle has for how they conceive of and research 
the role and contribution of tax in society.   
Tax is a compoQHQW SDUW RI D FRXQWU\¶V EURDGHU PDFURHFRQRPLF SROLF\ PL[ DQG GRHV, 
therefore, have a macroeconomic function. A first step in developing an alternative 
conception of the functions and roles of tax within this context requires a sense of why tax 
as process involves more than simple utilitarian calculations about how to most effectively 
raise revenue to fund government expenditure. An exploration of the claims of MMT 
provides the macroeconomic foundations for such an alternative framing (Murphy, 2015b, 
Wray, 2012).  The first section of this article explores the potential roles and functions of 
taxation within the framework of MMT. Second, some opposing views are discussed. A 
third, section considers the interaction between tax and µtax spends¶ within the UK, 
applying an MMT lens. Finally, the tax reform possibilities that arise from this alternative 
understanding are presented in a concluding section.  
Overall, our novel and original contribution is a counter-intuitive claim that the most 
important practical contribution of MMT lies in its potential to reframe how tax is thought 
about with implications for how tax systems can and should be designed. This emerges 
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WKURXJK007¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHSURFHVVRIPRQH\FUHDWLRQWKHVSHQG-tax cycle that results 
DQGWKHµFDQFHOODWLRQ¶IXQFWLRQSHUIRUPHGE\WD[. Cancellation refers to the fact that just as 
bank loan repayment cancels the money created by commercial bank lending, so too does 
tax payment cancel the money created by both government spending and private credit 
creation. The full implications of this for how tax should be conceived of in academic work 
and talked about in public debate as an instrument of social policy have not as yet been 
fully articulated. We move beyond the existing MMT literature, where both advocates and 
critics focus on money creation, government debt and inflation, with relatively little effort 
being made by either side to elaborate MMTs claims on tax or to establish their practical 
policy implications. For tax to play its cancellation role adequately, MMT scholars will 
need to theoretically elaborate a form of Modern Tax Theory (MTT) showing more fully 
how this function works, while developing policy tools and frameworks that can assess 
both the macroeconomic impact of tax policies and their social policy value, in terms 
consistent with MMT priorities (Murphy, 2019). We begin that process here with specific 
reference to social policy and encourage other scholars to further develop and apply these 
insights in future research.  
We also go beyond existing social policy literature, which has identified that social tax 
expenditures (STEs), or tax spends (Kay 1986), represent foregone revenue through reliefs 
and credits as a new form of fiscal welfare to recipients (Howard, 1997, Hacker, 2002, 
Morel et al, 2018). These STEs often favour higher income groups by incentivizing 
savings, private health care, and private education, constituting subtle, yet significant 
transformations in welfare states and social citizenship, in a new mode of governing social 
policy through fiscal welfare incentives (Morel et al, 2018: 550). Monitoring the costs of 
 5 
STEs is limited and incomplete (Sinfield, 2012) making them more politically acceptable 
than direct expenditures (Morel et al, 2018: 557). Under an MMT framing, conducting 
more systematic evaluations of STEs becomes imperative. MMT brings into relief that the 
problem with some STEs goes beyond mere lost revenue, to illuminate how they can 
interfere with macroeconomic integrity and stability more generally, by undermLQLQJWD[¶V 
cancellation function.  By highlighting the limited macroeconomic rationale for such 
policies, the MMT framing also reveals starkly that the primary impact of using STEs to 
prioritize savings and unearned investment income, are their regressive social effects. We 
advocate harnessing MMT insights with new tools for assessing tax policies and 
administrative practices, including their potential system undermining consequences, such 
as our recent tax spillover framework (Baker and Murphy, 2019a), to evaluate the 
combined macroeconomic and social implications of STEs on a more systematic basis. 
Social policy research needs to be central to such efforts. We provide the first account of 
what MMT insights mean for a thoroughgoing tax policy agenda, including how this can 
inform the evaluation of STEs. At the same time, we illuminate how systematic evaluations 
of STEs are necessary, if MMT is to translate its macroeconomic insights into a meaningful 
practical tax policy agenda. 
Tax and Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) 
In the United States, MMT has recently risen to prominence because of its role in shaping 
proposals for a Green New Deal resulting in a series of high-profile media exchanges 
between Stephanie Kelton  (2019) and Paul Krugman (2019), as well as Simon Wren-Lewis  
(2019) and Bill Mitchell (2019). Amidst these often-KHDWHGH[FKDQJHV007¶VSRWHQWLDO
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to broaden understandings and reframe public debate on the role of tax, especially in an era 
when experimentation with forms of quantitative easing has been widespread, has been 
lost. Scepticism about MMT has been commonplace, even among heterodox economists 
(Epstein, 2019). Unsurprisingly, as a result WKH LPSOLFDWLRQVRI007¶VPDFURHFRQRPLF
understandings for tax have received little attention outside the inner MMT sanctum. We 
show that one of the most practically usefully implications of the increasing prominence 
of MMT insights in public economic debate is that it provides a macroeconomic rationale 
and framing, which can help to renovate the social policy role of tax.  
Expert tax activists have identified six possible roles tax can perform within an economy 
(Murphy, 2015a, Cobham 2005). These are: 
1) Reclaiming the money that the government has spent in the economy with the aim 
of controlling inflation;  
2) Ratifying the value of money by creating demand for currency, through a 
requirement that tax is settled using the local currency of a country;  
3) Redistributing income and wealth;  
4) Repricing market failure, mainly to control externalities through Pigouvian taxes;  
5) Reorganising the economy, through the fiscal policy mix;  
6) Reinforcing democracy, by creating a public desire to influence how income tax is 
raised and spent, encouraging and motivating people to vote. 
 
These roles are not without a theoretical foundation, or justification. In what follows we 
elaborate more thoroughly what those theoretical foundations and justifications are.  
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MMT is an approach that has challenged conventional macroeconomic understandings of 
the relationship between tax and government spending.  Using national income accounting 
(Godley 1996,) orthodox macroeconomic thinking assumes that government spending 
(characterised as G) is funded by tax revenue raised (T), with any deficit or shortfall being 
funded by borrowing (B). In this formulation it is frequently suggested that G should equal 
T, with political opprobrium reserved for excess borrowing (HM Treasury 2017b, 4,). 
These are powerful basic beliefs that have contributed to constrained social spending 
throughout Europe in an age of austerity after the financial crisis with deleterious social 
consequences (Blyth, 2013, Dowler and Lambie Mumford, 2015, Taylor-Gooby, 2012, 
Edmiston, 2017, Matsaganis and Leventi, 2014). Concerns over reduced tax revenues have 
fed into reduced GDP spending on health and social security in the UK for example (IFS 
2019, 5).  
MMT challenges the propositions behind this logic and crucially reverses the sequencing 
underpinning it (Wray 2012). In the classic MMT formulation, a government with its own 
currency and central bank spends before it taxes, bringing the money through which taxes 
are paid into existence (Mitchell et al 2019, 124). Government spending on the basis of 
available central bank credit, is, as with all money creation, a process that does not require 
the existence of prior deposits in a bank (McLeay et al 2014) or, in the case of a 
government, revenue raised in advance by taxation. If a government insists on taxes being 
paid in sovereign currency, that currency must, in the MMT view, first be created to enable 
those taxes to be paid (Wray 2012, 47i). 
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,Q WKH007XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKLV µVSHQGDQG WD[F\FOH¶DVRSSRVHG WRD µWD[DQGVSHQG
F\FOH¶KDVWKUHHSULPDU\LPSOLFDWLRQV)LUVWWD[JLYHVDFXUUHQF\LWVYDOXH0LWFKHOOHWDO
2019, 137). A government accepting its own currency in the settlement of tax creates 
demand for the currency it issues and gives meaning to the promise to pay printed on bank 
notes as the foundation of modern money. Second, the requirement that tax be paid using 
this currency usually requires that the currency in question be used as a medium for 
exchange within the economy (Murphy 2015a, 64 ii ). Third, the raw mechanics of 
government spending when a national sovereign currency and national central bank exist, 
involves crediting the accounts of actors in receipt of that government spending. Tax 
revenue is consequently not prior, but subsequent to spending. 
The account presented in the sequence above is a central tenet of MMT. It is underpinned 
by a reality in which all money, excluding notes and coins, is created by bank lending, as 
has been acknowledged by the Bank of England (McLeay et al 2014). MMT applies this 
understanding to the distinct relationship between a government and its central bank.  It 
argues first that a government, unlike a household (or a commercial bank) creates the 
currency being used in a jurisdiction, and declares it sovereign. Second, whereas 
households and banks are constrained by their income and the funds required for solvency, 
governments can through their central banks issue currency and create money. Third, 
according to MMT therefore, G need not equal T, because money can be created at will to 
settle government debt by the government issuing instruction to the central bank to make 
settlementiii.  
 9 
The formulation below can be seen as an interpretation of orthodox economics which posits 
that the basic national income functions relating to tax are as follows: 
 * 7¨% 
ZKHUH¨%LVWKHFKDQJHLQJRYHUQPHQWERUURZLQJLQD\HDU 
MMT expresses this function as (Mitchell et al 2019): 
 * 7¨%¨0 
wKHUH ¨0 LV WKH FKDQJH LQ WKH TXDQWLW\ RI JRYHUQPHQW PRQH\ FUHDWHG LQ D SHULRG
Government created money (M) can in this context simply refer to an overdraft it runs at 
its central bank. However, given that these are generally illegal (Jacome et al 2012,) in the 
contemporary era such practices have taken the form of quantitative easing, where the 
government instructs the central bank to purchase assets including government debt. In the 
UK this has led to the government effectively owning (via the Bank of England) £435 
billion of its own debt, which withdraws it from effective circulation as a result and cancels 
DOO LQWHUHVWFRVWVXSRQLW7KH%DQNRI(QJODQGGHVFULEHVWKLVDVµQHZPRQH\¶%DQNRI
EnglaQGFRQILUPLQJLWLVµ0¶ 
Just as in the current Bank of England explanation of money creation where loan repayment 
withdraws money from circulation and effectively cancels it (McLeay et al 2014,), so too 
does the payment of tax contribute to the cancellation of the debt that a government creates 
in the system when it spends in the MMT explanation of the government revenue cycle. 
This cancellation process means that tax acts to reduce spending capacity in an economy 
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(money withdrawal), simultaneously restraining demand (Fullwiler et al, 2019) and 
contributing to price stability (Mitchell et al 2019, 323). Freed from a fixation with the 
revenue raising efficiency of individual tax measures, the MMT position casts tax in a more 
overt and active countercyclical macroeconomic stabilisation role. As we will show 
through consideration of the UK case, this also potentially allows this cancellation role to 
be combined with the use of tax to promote social policy objectives considered desirable 
by society and policy makers alike.  
 
In the existing MMT literature, however, accounts of the potential social policy role of tax 
remain thin, focusing almost entirely on the so-FDOOHG µMREV JXDUDQWHH,¶ with full 
employment the primary MMT policy objective (Wray et al 2018). MMT effectively 
contains more far reaching intellectual justification for evaluating so called STEs, but 
developing a form of MMT derived modern tax theory (MTT), would assist in this 
endeavour (Murphy, 2019).   
Critics have argued that MMT overestimates the tax rates that the public are willing to 
tolerate (Palley, 2015). U.S. Conservative Bruce Bartlett (2019) suggests that MMT is a 
kind of Laffer Curve for the Left, permitting spurious magical thinking to justify increased 
public spending without considering inflationary consequences. MMT economists use the 
logic of sectoral accounting balances to assert the non-inflationary nature of their case, but 
their relative lack of engagement with inflation as a social and expectations driven social 
phenomenon, rather than as a mathematical proposition, is a potential $FKLOOHV¶ heel. 
Nevertheless, the implications of MMT insights on the sequences of the spend-tax cycle, 
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where tax is not confined to revenue-raising and tax revenue is not prior to government 
spending, are worthy of further exploration.  
Our focus here is on the sequential insight that governments do not first need access to tax 
revenues to spend. This enables tax policies to be more fully viewed and understood in 
terms of a broader range of macroeconomic and societal functions. The implication of such 
an observation is as much political and discursive, in terms of widening public debates, 
political narratives and shifting mind-sets, as it is economic and technical. It also has 
potential consequences for the research agendas of social scientists focused on tax. Tax 
policy decisions, become less about their utilitarian revenue raising merits and more about 
their wider macroeconomic effects, as well as the extent to which they enable governments 
and societies to realise objectives and priorities that the democratic process and societal 
deliberation deem important, - or their social purpose and the kind of economic system and 
social settlement to which they contribute (Baker, 2018). 
One example, of the kind of mind-set shift these MMT derived observations facilitate is 
provided by corporation tax. In the UK, public debate focuses on the appropriate level of 
corporation tax to most efficiently raise revenue (IFS, 2017, Jackson and Houlder, 2017). 
But this is a limited way of assessing the merits of particular policies. While corporation 
tax can be an important revenue raising device, especially in developing countries, the 
reasons for its original introduction go far beyond revenue raising capacity. Corporation 
and capital gains taxes have a long-standing defensive rationale. That is they reinforce and 
buttress other direct taxes such as income tax, or social security, maintaining the integrity 
and functioning of tax systems as integrated entities. Without these taxes, it becomes easier 
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for individuals to present income as a capital gains, or to transfer it to a company structure, 
leaving it untaxed.  
 
Such rationales were cited in the legislative debates surrounding the introduction of 
corporation tax bills in both the United Kingdom and the United States (Baker and Murphy, 
2019, p.182, Bank 2001). Once we begin to think in terms of a buttressing function for 
corporate taxes limiting potential leakages in tax systems and holding them together as 
entire entities, evaluations of corporate taxation can shift from a focus on revenue raising 
efficiency, to assessments of whether they fulfil their original intended purpose of 
reinforcing a tax system as a whole (Baker and Murphy, 2019). Likewise, WKHµUHJXODWRU\
UDWLRQDOH¶IRUFRUSRrate tax proposed by legal scholars sees corporation tax as a mechanism 
for increasing the accountability and regulating the activities of corporate managers (Avi-
Yonah, 2004). Tax in this interpretation is about shaping economic activity and social 
relations. It fulfils a social purpose distinct from revenue raising. It also means a range of 
tax practices, policies and reliefs need to be evaluated to assess whether corporate taxes 
fulfil this function (Baker and Murphy, 2019). 
 
In public debate and to a lesser degree scholarship, these questions of designing and 
assessing taxes to fulfil a broader social purpose, remain marginalised and obscured by the 
fixation on tax as a revenue raising device. MMT provides intellectual foundations to help 
overcome that fixation. 
 
Criticism of the MMT approach 
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Some criticisms of MMT positions have already been noted. Among the most relevant is 
that using taxes for macroeconomic stabilization purposes is difficult in practice: taxes are 
hard to change at short notice (Krugman, 2019). Likewise, it has been suggested 
governments are reluctant to increase taxes due to electoral pressures (Epstein, 2019). In 
this reading MMT may underestimate the political economy constraints on using tax for 
macroeconomic stabilization. However, a sustained period in which interest rates have 
been at, or close to the zero lower bound also increases pressures for tax to play such a role. 
Nor do these objections detract from the fact that some STEs can have destabilising 
macroeconomic effects.   
In the UK, the work of Jonathan Portes (2019) and Simon Wren-Lewis (2018) has shaped 
WKH /DERXU 3DUW\¶V )LVFDO &UHGLELOLW\ 5XOH /DERXU  7KLV LV LQWHQGHG WR SURYLGH
reassurance to voters that day-to-day spending will be balanced and borrowing will only 
be used to fund investment (Ahmed 2016). In essence, the assumption that tax is needed to 
fund government spending (T=G) is respected, with some allowances for minimal levels 
of government debt. Both authors have defended their positions and rejected MMT 
criticisms of their approach, by citing the need for independent authorities and rules that 
tie a government¶s hands, as a means of providing reassurance to voters that government 
debt will not be excessive. This reflects the most prominent critique of MMT that it places 
too much faith in governments to exercise restraint (Epstein, 2019) and LJQRUHV³SROLWLFDO
HFRQRP\GLIILFXOWLHV´where politicians are tempted to use monetary policy for electoral 
purposes (Palley, 2015).  
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Such critiques have largely been aimed at questioning the political and policy realism of 
adopting MMT policy prescriptions, such as those proposed by American Congresswoman 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (2019) in a US version of the Green New Deal based on green 
infrastructure quantitative easing (Murphy and Hines 2010, Green New Deal Group, 2013, 
Murphy 2015b). The stakes are certainly high in terms of the potential of MMT to achieve 
public policy objectives. But given their focus, these critiques have largely overlooked the 
implications of the sequences of an MMT spend-tax cycle. In this sense, the reservations 
they raise should not preclude efforts to consider more thoroughly the implications of 
MMT insights for tax.  
MMT, tax allowances and reliefs and the implications for UK tax policy 
In this section we examine how an MMT perspective can help to illuminate distortions 
within the UK tax system and point a pathway to reform. The governance of the UK tax 
system and the debates around it, as we have seen focus largely on revenue raising.  Table 
1 shows forecast revenues for the tax years 2018/19 and 2019/20. 
Table 1 ± Official Published Public Sector receipts (net of reliefs). 
Tax year 2019 ± 20 2018 ± 19 
 ¶EQ ¶EQ 
Income tax 193 185 
National insurance 
contributions 
142 134 
Excise duties  50 49 
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Corporation tax 60 55 
VAT 156 145 
Business rates 31 30 
Council tax 36 34 
Other taxes 89 86 
Other non-taxes 54 51 
Total 811 769 
Source: HM Treasury (2017, 2018) 
What is not made clear in the official data, such as the table above, is that the stated figures 
are net of tax reliefs and allowances. There are thought to be more than 1,000 of these 
allowances (National Audit Office 2014), the cost of which are estimated to be at least 
£425bn in 2018/19 (HMRC 2019a).  
 
Allowances are given for a great variety of reasons  (Hills, 2015; Xu and Joyce, 2019). The 
individual personal allowance, which provides an annual tax free sum to all who have 
income subject to income tax is the most expensive allowance, costing £107bn. The zero 
rating of food for VAT purposes, which is intended to ensure all have access to food at a 
reasonable price, costs £18.6bn a year. Tax relief on the investment by business in assets, 
irrespective of their social value, costs almost as much, at £18.1bn, while tax reliefs for 
pensions cost at least £43.7bn pa, and another £10bn more when the tax exempt status of 
pension funds is taken into account. Other tax reliefs for savings, such as those on 
Individual Savings Accounts, cost £4.6bn in income tax foregone, and more when capital 
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gains tax is allowed for. Not taxing capital gains on SHRSOH¶VKRPHVFRVWVEn a year. 
Inheritance tax exemptions cost over £22bn and the tax only collects £5.5bn as a result. In 
the circumstances the exemption of disability living allowance from tax at a cost of £1.1bn 
is almost insignificant, and is dwarfed by the cost of the VAT exemption of education at 
£4.1bn a year, most of the benefit of which goes to private schools.  
The implication of these allowances is that the data in table 1 is misstated. It could, when 
allowances and reliefs are provided for be stated as follows: 
Table 2 ± Tax revenues for 2018 ± 19 tax year taking the cost of tax reliefs and 
allowances into account 
Tax Gross notional 
revenues when the 
cost of tax reliefs 
and allowances is 
taken into account 
Cost of tax reliefs 
and allowances 
Net tax receipts 
reported by the 
Office for Budget 
Responsibility 
 ¶EQ ¶EQ ¶EQ 
Income tax 336 151 185 
National 
insurance 
contributions 
142 87 134 
Excise duties  49 0 49 
Corporation tax 84 29 55 
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VAT 244 99 145 
Business rates 30 0 30 
Council tax 34 0 34 
Other taxes 145 59 86 
Other non-taxes 51 0 51 
Total 1,194 425 769 
Sources HM Treasury (2018) and HMRC (2019a) 
The actual potential tax base created by UK tax law, based on this method of calculation, 
is almost £1.2trn per annum, or 56 per cent of GDP based on Office for Budget 
Responsibility data (2019, page 67). However, of this sum at least 35 per cent (and maybe 
more) is then forgone by government choice. This highlights the significance of tax spends 
(Kay, 1986), or STEs, and also makes clear that the costs of redistributing income and 
wealth; repricing market failure and reorganising the economy (Murphy, 2015a,) are 
already implicit within the tax system but are almost never identified as such because the 
data in Table 2 is never made available by the UK government as a basis for policy 
discussions ( McDaniel and Surrey, 1985; Corlett, 2015). 
From an MMT perspective this omission is problematic for two reasons. First, lack of 
coverage of these allowances and reliefs prevents a full and proper consideration of their 
social implications and their appropriateness. Such consideration would allow a greater 
degree of finesse in targeting potential tax revenues for distributional objectives that simple 
adjustment of rates alone cannot provide. Likewise, their effectiveness in performing the 
cancellation function of tax by reducing demand and sectoral inflationary pressures is 
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similarly obscured by the minimal oversight of STEs (Sinfield, 2012). Rather than ignoring 
political economy difficulties therefore, MMT usefully highlights biases in tax policy in 
terms of redistribution and inequality that simultaneously act to hamper the utility of tax 
SROLFLHV¶ cancellation function.  
A second reason emerging from an MMT framing is that many of these allowances and 
reliefs exist to encourage savings. They can increase individual economic resilience to 
some extent, but as MMT shows, savings are not required to fund investment.  Instead 
MMT argues that investment can always be, and usually is, funded by bank created credit. 
Yet the UK tax system is designed to incentivise savings with a consequent considerable 
increase in the value of those savings, as Table 3 shows: 
Table 3 - Breakdown of aggregate total wealth, by components Great Britain, July 
2012 to June 2016 
  £ billion 
 
 
July 2012 to 
 June 2014 
July 2014 to 
 June 2016 
Percentage  
Change 
Property Wealth (net) 3,806 4,516 19 
Financial Wealth (net) 1,564 1,630 4 
Physical Wealth 1,130 1,230 9 
Private Pension Wealth 4,385 5,354 22 
Total Wealth (including Private 
Pension Wealth) 10,886 12,730 17 
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Total Wealth (excluding Private 
Pension Wealth) 6,500 7,376 13 
Source: ONS (2018) 
This savings wealth is very concentrated within society.  
Chart 1  
 
Source: ONS (2018) 
This distribution means that the bottom 10 per cent of households have total wealth of 
£13,900 or less; median total household wealth is £262,400; the top 10 per cent of 
households have total wealth of at least £1,224,900 and the top 1 per cent of households 
have total wealth of £3,243,400 or more (ONS 2018). 
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Tax heavily impacts on this distribution: as Table 3 shows in 2016, 35 per cent of all wealth 
was property, with much of that family homes exempted from a charge to capital gains tax, 
usually irrespective of size or value. A further 42 per cent is in pension funds, which enjoy 
expensive tax subsidies. The annual cost of pension subsidies in 2017/18 (the most recent 
available data) amounted to £54.7bn (HMRC 2019c, page 29). In addition, of the net 
financial wealth of £1.6 trillion, more than £500 billion was represented by ISA account 
balances (HMRC 2019b, page 13). In total, therefore, it is likely that 81 per cent of UK 
personal wealth is held in heavily tax incentivised assets. The tax system ± which 
incentivises these assets at a cost of more than £86n a year - is not neutral in the process. 
This analysis suggests that about 20 per cent of tax reliefs might be used in ways that 
promote inequality in the UK, while serving little macroeconomic purpose from an MMT 
perspective. This alone cannot, however, explain the increase in savings noted in Table 3, 
which suggests that savings increased by more than £1.8trn in just two years, or by 17 per 
cent.   
A full explanation of that requires acknowledgement that M can be created in the form of 
quantitative easing (QE). In the UK, QE has had as its goal an increase in the price of the 
remaining bonds in the market, which was necessary to keep interest rates on those bonds 
low (Bank of England 2019). This process of deliberately inflating the value of government 
bonds inevitably increased the financial worth of those who owned them, effectively 
delivering very significant gains to a small group in society, made up of the already 
wealthyiv.  
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Four points arise from the preceding discussion. Firstly, existing tax reliefs have fuelled an 
increase in wealth inequality in the UK (Rowlingson and McKay, 2012; Bell and Corlett, 
2019; Hebden et al, 2019). Secondly, MMT sees this as misguided because it is largely 
based on a premise that savings are required to fund investment. Thirdly, no other part of 
the tax system is currently compensating for the resulting inequalities that these subsidies 
create. Fourth, these reliefs also risk macroeconomic instability by stoking asset 
inflationary pressures in particular sectors. The MMT framing when applied in this wayv, 
does create a rationale for reform of the UK tax system in a fashion that places social policy 
considerations centre stage, but also strengthens the intellectual case for more systematic 
evaluations of STEs, using an MMT framing.  
MMT¶V LQVLJKWV RQ WKH Vpend-tax cycle and the resulting cancellation function, also 
effectively elevate social policy criteria as the basis for evaluating tax measures¶
usefulness. In the UK, reforming pension tax reliefs that cost more than £50 billion a 
year and the potential removal of ISA tax reliefs are already the subject of debate (House 
of Commons, 2018). Other potential measures include ending inheritance reliefs for 
agricultural property, because they can inflate land values, while ensuring the continuity of 
land ownership by absentee landlords. As the data discussed earlier revealed, reliefs that 
treat investment, savings and inheritance income favourably in the UK, have increased 
savings and accumulated assets, but have also exacerbated income and wealth inequality. 
From an MMT perspective, tax reliefs that encourage and preserve pools of capital in this 
way also potentially undermine the cancellation function of taxation, while risking asset 
inflation.  
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A modified proposal from the UK Green New Deal Group (2019, forthcoming) suggests 
that ISA and pension reliefs, rather than being abolished altogether, could have attached to 
them a condition that funds saved through these mechanisms, be invested in activity 
intended to tackle climate crisis. In this creative way, tax reliefs can be restructured and 
placed at the wider service of re-ordering the financial system towards mitigating climate 
change. In the United States, similar tax proposals have been developed under the Green 
New Deal proposals of Senator Bernie Sanders. They include increasing taxes on the fossil 
fuel industry to reduce production levels. Simultaneous investments in 20 million new jobs 
to help with infrastructure and energy transitions, would in turn be partially cancelled by 
the fossil fuel industry tax and extra income tax generated by new jobs.  A new proposed 
µZRUNRSSRUWXQLW\WD[FUHGLW¶IRUHPSOR\HUV who employ workers displaced by the energy 
transition would constitute a relief simultaneously encouraging employment and reduced 
fossil fuel use.  
These examples illustrate how an MMT framing can inform the re-design of systems of tax 
reliefs on a more systematic basis so as to more effectively serve important social policy 
priorities. One tool that would support such a shift and provide social policy scholars with 
an additional source of data is tax spillover assessment (Baker and Murphy, 2019a). A tax 
spillover is the impact one aspect of tax policy has on the available tax base within the 
same state, or other states (IFS, 2011; Nanda and Parkes, 2019). As well as discouraging 
states from pursuing policies that can be shown to harm the tax bases of other states, 
spillover assessments consider the relationships between different features of the same tax 
system and ask whether they reinforce or undermine those elements (domestic spillovers). 
In MMT terms, this enables a fuller picture to be drawn of whether particular policies 
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within a tax system, undermine the withdrawal function of the tax system in its entirety. At 
the same time, such assessments help to illuminate whether certain current tax practices 
have an implicit and often hidden social policy bias.  
Applying, a spillover assessment tool kit in a full UK assessment, revealed that both capital 
gains and corporation tax provisions encouraged the shifting of income out of the income 
tax base (Baker and Murphy, 2019b, p.5). At the same time, a whole range of exemptions, 
allowances and reliefs, were found to provide favour to income earned from wealth rather 
than from work, further incentivizing the under reporting of income (Baker and Murphy, 
2019b, p.4). A recommendation emerging from that assessment was that all allowances 
and reliefs offered in the UK should be systematically evaluated to determine: their cost; 
their economic effectiveness; the benefits arising from continuing to offer them; any impact 
of their withdrawal. The need for systematic evaluations of STEs has been identified by 
the social policy literature (Sinfield, 2012; Morel et al, 2018), but locating such evaluations 
within an MMT framing would enable them to serve a dual macroeconomic and social 
policy function, leading to more accurate assessments of a tax regime¶s capacity to fulfil 
its cancellation function.   
Conclusions: tax reforms suggested by modern monetary theory and spillover 
analysis 
In this article, we have sought to show that an MMT framing strengthens arguments for tax 
reform that would simultaneously be more effective in maintaining the non-inflationary 
macroeconomic integrity of the spend-tax cycle, while achieving social policy objectives 
of employment creation, encouraging a green energy transition, and reducing inequality.  
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A crucial, but often neglected question in designing the configuration of tax policies and 
practices, is whether those practices reinforce, or undermine parts of the same tax system, 
or administration (Baker and Murphy, 2019a). Using MMT insights on money creation and 
the resulting spend-investment/ tax cycle, we have illustrated how certain tax reliefs 
incentivise savings. From a macroeconomic perspective that is not only questionable, but 
can also spill over to undermine other parts of the same tax system, while producing an 
expansion in wealth inequality. An MMT framing, when harnessed with a direct 
application of spillover analysis to the UK demonstrates that this is a double ill from both 
a macroeconomic and social policy perspective (Baker and Murphy, 2019a, 2019b).  
The analytical steps taken in this contribution point to a potential tax reform agenda, which 
would achieve useful macroeconomic and social policy objectives. The thumbnail sketch 
we have provided is intended to provoke others to further consider how tax reforms can 
serve a dual macroeconomic and social policy purpose. For example, taxing capital gains 
at the same rates as in the 1980s and similar moves to restore corporation tax to pre-2010 
levels would discourage the diversion of income into company structures, which 
undermines both income tax, and potentially the cancellation or withdrawal function of the 
tax system as a whole. Generous capital gains tax allowances on buy-to-let properties, that 
potentially fuel asset inflation and reduce access to affordable homes, could be 
substantially reduced. The proceeds from reduced allowances could then be invested in 
social housing. The fact that national insurance charges in the UK apply only to income 
from work, but not investment income, also make it a potential target for reform based on 
the application of similar MMT logics. At present, those who work for a living pay 
considerably more tax on identical levels of income than those who receive income as a 
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return on investments of a variety of forms. When the saving process is not required to 
drive investment, the socially regressive nature of such policies becomes much clearer.  
Harnessing the insights of MMT to new governance tools such as tax spillover assessments, 
can therefore help to show how tax can be used and designed to perform important creative 
social policy functions, and at the same time be made more effective in macroeconomic 
terms. The proposals we highlight here, are a mere pointer, but they are indicative of the 
kind of tax reform agenda that the application of an MMT lens and its mind-set shift can 
generate. Re-engineering tax systems to serve social policy objectives in the light of these 
insights is an interdisciplinary undertaking. Social policy researchers can and should be at 
the forefront of informing such an undertaking, but they can be aided by an engagement 
with, and a fuller elaboration of, the MMT perspective on tax.    
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i This relates to the practical mechanics of how government spending actually occurs. Governments spend 
by crediting the accounts of those entities they are investing in thereby creating new money. From the 
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taxation.   
ii Dollarisation in some developing countries is a rather different case. 
iii The question of the limits to this is not something we consider here, though it does not fundamentally 
undermine the sequential case we present here. 
iv From an MMT perspective QE could fund a Universal Basic Income (UBI) Standing (2017), or full 
employment through a Job Guarantee (Mitchell et al 2019, 295). Both are examples of monetary financed 
fiscal policy serving social policy objectives to mitigate inequality. 
v To the best of our knowledge it has not been to date. 
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